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Abstract It is often claimed that participation empowers local actors and that an inclusive
decision-making process is crucial for rural development. We aim to investigate how
formal and informal rules are set in local decision-making processes and how those rules
may impact the actual level of participation by local actors. In a comparative case study,
the rules-in-use for the planning of community projects in Thailand are examined. For our
analysis, we use the Institutional Analysis and Development framework, which allows for
more precise analysis of the impact of the rules. Fifty-three villages are served by four
selected Tambon Administrative Organisations (TAO) which are either known for success
in achieving participation or ranked as problematic in implementing the decentralization
and local participation goals of the Thai government. The study is based on 60 semi-
structured interviews with TAO staff, a survey of village leaders in 50 villages and a
household survey of 104 villagers. We scrutinize seven types of rules and show some
particular differences in terms of the impact from the rules-in-use. In the TAOs ranked as
less participatory, the attendance rate in the meetings is found to be lower (boundary rule),
villagers are informed about a meeting with a shorter notice (information rule) and more
villagers mention that elites interfere in the project selection process (aggregation rule). A
high level of fuzziness appeared in the position and authority rules. Further, we obtained
information on the particular deontic logic, showing generally a high share of de facto
may-statements in the implementation of the rules. We conclude that if the policy goal is
enhancing participation, rule-setting offers good scope for intervention. From a practical
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perspective, information on administrative procedures has to be made more accessible and
public administrators should receive procedural training.
Keywords Political decision-making  Participation  Rules  IAD framework  Deontic
logic  Thailand
Introduction
An important issue in political decision-making, rural development and local natural
resource management is empowerment of local actors through participation. This partic-
ipation should be ideally a form of engagement that values discussion, reflection and
consideration over simply voting (Chambers 2003). Even though the issue has its con-
troversies (Speer 2012), a vast portion of authors promotes citizen participation and
engagement highlighting positive impacts thereof on numerous development outcomes
(Irvin and Stansbury 2004; Gaventa and Barrett 2012). An example of such an impact can
be an improved transparency in decision-making processes as well as strengthened per-
ceived legitimacy of their outcomes (Birnbaum et al. 2015). Likewise, participation
facilitates the break down of the complexity of problems and increases the participant’s
level of knowledge (Raisio and Vartiainen 2015). Research in the field of policy sciences
has shown the positive impact of participation also on local political decision-making and
development. Birnbaum et al. (2015), for instance, point out that the perceived legitimacy
can be increased with participatory procedures, which is one factor of success not only in
natural resource management projects but also in development projects. Thus, we have to
ask how participation can be effectively achieved and more precisely, what the specific
rules are that enable and structure initial deliberative processes leading to improved par-
ticipation. Considerable work in political science and economics has examined how
specific rules affect the incentives and outcomes for a wide diversity of situations (Ostrom
2014). Yet, in contrast to Araral (2014), we do not study how rules should be designed in
order to reduce transaction costs, we rather want to see, in the first place, what rules we can
detect and to what extent those are responsible for effective participation.
In order to understand the detailed rules-driven underlying mechanisms of community
members’ decision-making within the local development context in Thailand the article
proceeds as follows. In ‘‘Rules in participatory procedures’’ section, we continue with
explaining the ambitious decentralization program of the government structures in Thai-
land and the peculiarities of Thai communication habits. We state that rules, as exogenous
factors, are responsible for the actually achieved level of participation, not without the
account of the criticism on the distributional consequences of participatory processes per
se. For our analysis, we use the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework,
as described in ‘‘The IAD framework: a rules framework’’ section, which allows for more
precise analysis of the impact of rules, and we conclude with classifying seven types of
rules. ‘‘Research area and data collection’’ section describes the research area and the data
collection. ‘‘The action situation: local development planning’’ section disentangles the
Action Situations I and II of the planning process which are ‘‘surveying villagers’ needs’’
and ‘‘compiling villagers needs into a Tambon development plan.’’ Further, participants
and positions in both action situations are presented. ‘‘Rules’’ section provides detailed
results on the rules and deontic logic discovered, structured along the seven types of rules
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and according to the action situations I and II. We conclude with findings on the differ-
ences between the more and less participatory TAOs as well as with some practical lessons
that policy makers can actually address in order to increase public participation.
Rules in participatory procedures
In examining the participatory procedures in Thailand more closely, it became apparent
that the actual participation of local communities can be hindered by both endogenous and
exogenous institutions, which are mutually interlinked (Aoki 2007). Following Laswell’s
pledge for contextuality (1971, p. 3), decisions are always part of a larger social process
and require to integrate the endogenous cultural factors, too. In Thailand, the endogenous
factors such as cultural values and communication habits toward higher ranking officials
are driven by collectivism, high-power distance and the cultural norm of Krengjai.1 In that
context, Nuttavuthisit et al. (2014) raise the question in how far formal rule-setting can
help to achieve people’s participation in local government despite the hindering culture of
compliance to superiors. We would argue, however, that even if the endogenous factors
were in line with what is needed for successful engagement, participation could still be
hindered by the rules, according to which the actual decision-making process in local
public administration and government is organized. But, independent of the endogenous
factors that affect participatory success, exogenous factors can allow significant scope for
intervention (Lowndes et al. 2006). Such exogenous factors include the rules-in-form and
rules-in-use2 within the administrative bodies that define the interaction with the local
population. Rules are understood as being socially designed and being one key element in
understanding participants’ behaviors and interaction. To understand where the obstacles
to villager participation might be reduced, it will be necessary to clearly identify these rules
within the administrative bodies.
Such rules need to be analyzed for their distributional consequences as well. In that
regard, there has been substantial criticism about the concept of participation. Some
scholars argue that participatory approaches have often failed to achieve meaningful
societal change owing to a failure to reflect issues of elite capture and politics (Bardhan
2002). Lortanavanit (2009, p. 176) concludes for Thailand that rural communities do not
have enough weight to push through development projects that are better in line with their
needs. Chaowarat (2010, p. 106, 109) likewise criticizes that the current process of deci-
sion-making in local development in Thailand is a one-way flow of information without
genuine discussion or negotiation between local government and communities. To coun-
teract this development, the understanding of rules is important, as administrative rules for
interaction with the local population have to be constructed in a way that restricts the
power holders from getting hold of the process and gaining disproportional benefits. Yet
rules are often treated as a black box and how they matter has not been extensively studied
(Araral 2014).
In contrast to the majority of studies in participation research, we are not studying the
performance of participation efforts and the impact of stakeholder participation on policy
making. Rather, we proceed from a ranking of well and badly performing regional
administrative bodies in Thailand in terms of participation. We want to scrutinize the
1 Krengjai allows for a harmonious resolution of differences. Involved parties soften opinions, restrain
emotions, and refrain from strong direct criticism (Roongrengsuke and Chansuthus 1998, p. 185).
2 Rules-in-use are the actually followed rules, which can be a mixture of formal and informal ones.
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different formal and informal rules in local policy arenas, particularly in view of devel-
opment planning processes, according to the achieved level of participation. We want to
know the determinants of the actual level of stakeholder engagement that are influenced by
precise rule-setting of an action arena.
We selected Thailand as a case study because it provides a clear evidence of how within
the last two decades the decentralization process has brought a substantial change in the
local administration with respect to delegating governance to local administrative bodies
(Nagai et al. 2008, p. 29). The Thai case, even more, allows investigating the implications
of rule making as a result of decentralization in a substantial detail. The success of
decentralization is closely interlinked with the question whether or not decentralization
gives space for villagers’ participation in local government (Larson and Ribot 2004). Thus,
we understand that decentralization and participation ought to gain momentum when
promoted simultaneously. Nonetheless, participation in decentralization is a major
administrative challenge, as will be shown. It does not take place in an institutional
vacuum. It happens in a sociocultural environment as well as in a context of inherited rules
and procedures. Within an ambitious decentralization program of government structures in
the early 1990s, the Thai government has created the Tambon Administrative Organiza-
tions (TAOs) which represent the lowest administrative bodies and likewise the arenas in
which deliberative stakeholder participation ought to take place (Dufhues et al. 2015). The
TAOs are supposed to increase the role of the rural population at the community level and
empower them in decision-making. In this context, various tasks of the central adminis-
tration such as budget and personnel management have been transferred to the TAOs
(Kanjina 2008; Krueathep 2004). The TAOs serve as our research units, or more specifi-
cally, the ‘‘development plan making’’ activities institutionalized within these organiza-
tions constitute the basis of our analysis.3 The rules introduced since decentralization
within the TAOs will be classified according to the IAD framework’s typology of rules
(Ostrom 1998, pp. 68–73). This analytical classification allows us to disentangle the
detailed rules-in-use within the local planning process of community projects in Thai
TAOs and to judge on the deliberative democratic qualities of the decision-making process.
Already in 1971, Lasswell (1971, p. 2) hints to the idea that the norms of conduct are partly
determined and made effective outside the machinery of legislation, administration and
adjudication, which, once again, stresses the need to study the actual rules-in-use.
This leads us to our more abstract research question: What is the possible impact of
certain rules in a decision-making process on the actually achieved level of participation?
We hypothesize that in the more successful TAOs the rules are structured and set up in a
way to take the immanent constraints within administrative organizations (such as
bureaucratic inertia and path dependency) into account and to be better compatible with the
endogenous factors of the society. Thus, we aim to reach conclusions on preconditions, i.e.,
necessary up-front rule changes that would allow for better participation within the process
of local development planning.
3 Most common projects are village roads, irrigation canals and dykes. Less common projects are women




The IAD framework: a rules framework
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, developed by Elinor
Ostrom and scholars associated with the Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy
Analysis at Indiana University, contains a nested set of variables that scientists can use in
efforts to understand human interactions and outcomes across diverse settings. In line with
the broad prevalence of this framework in natural resource management (Ostrom 1998,
p. 82), its application for participatory research is steadily growing (Denters and Klok
2003; Monnikhof et al. 2003; Koontz 2005; Smajgl et al. 2009; Lowndes et al. 2006; Van
Damme and Brans 2012).4 Speer (2012) even stresses its potential to study participatory
processes. The framework is known for its ability to address the challenges of collective
and deliberative decision-making. In one of his approaches to policy sciences, Lasswell
(1971) uses ‘‘an action arena’’ or ‘‘the situations in which interaction occurs’’ (1971, p. 25)
in the center of his framework to point out that the actual situations are part of the
equipment essentials to a policy scientist. In his model of social processes, same as in the
IAD framework, Lasswell (1971, p. 24, 44) for instance conceptualizes participants, spe-
cializing here participation in decision-making, that take on various positions.
One of the main strengths of the IAD framework is its explicit attention to rules and
rule-ordered relationships (Koontz 2005; Ostrom 2014). Thus, we use the framework to
pay attention to the structure of the various rules-in-use that have an impact on our action
situation, which is the planning process administered within the TAOs for new community
development projects at the Tambon level. Applying the IAD framework does not nec-
essarily mean an extensive analysis of all variable sets. Although we are very much aware
of the context dependence—whether participation can be realized or not, the intention of
this paper is to focus and elaborate on the impact of rules.
The center of the framework builds the action arena, a social space in which individuals
interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems, dominate one another, or argue
(Ostrom 1998, p. 82). The framework considers three sets of variables influencing the
outcome of collective decision-making: (1) biophysical conditions, (2) attributes of the
community and (3) rules-in-use that create incentives and constraints for certain actions
(Ostrom 2005, 2010). The rules shape action situations and people’s behavior differently
depending on what behavior they permit, the specific institutional decision-making pro-
cedures used to devise them and how they are implemented or enforced (Ostrom 2010). All
three sets of external variables impact on an action situation to generate patterns of
interactions and outcomes that are evaluated by participants and shape the next action
situation (Ostrom et al. 1994, p. 37; Ostrom 2010). Participants as defined in our action
situation can hold various positions such as TAO staff, various committee members,
village key persons and ordinary villagers (Fig. 1). The action situation filled with actual
participants, their positions and the corresponding action, is what we refer to as a particular
action arena. We define the action situation as the development planning process of local
communities (Fig. 1).
4 Denters and Klok (2003) and Monnikhof et al. (2003) use it for analyzing public consultations; Koontz
(2005, p. 459) investigates stakeholder participation in environmental policy by using the IAD framework.
Lowndes et al. (2006) examine how the level and style of participation is shaped by locally distinctive rules-
in-use. Smajgl et al. (2009) test how the IAD framework can be applied to the circumstances of Australia’s
outback regions. One case study touches upon community participation in land use decision determined by
rules-in-use (Smajgl et al. 2009, p. 50, 74). Van Damme and Brans (2012) use it as a conceptual tool to study
the openness of process rules in public consultations.
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Looking more precisely into the building blocks of institutions, rules have to be dif-
ferentiated from strategies and norms (Ostrom 2014). Following the Grammar of Institu-
tions outlined by Crawford and Ostrom (1995, pp. 584–586) and aiming at a common and
more precise language for institutional analysis, individual’s internalized moral values and
social mechanism of enforcement to determine why individuals do or do not follow an
institution and thus specify a norm. Participants do acquire most norms in the context of
the community, in which the individual interacts frequently, based on an internal value
assigned to the norm-conforming action. Rules are similar to norms but rules carry an
additional assigned sanction (or-else parameter) if forbidden actions are taken and
observed by a monitor (Ostrom 2014). Conceptually, some kind of monitoring and sanc-
tions must exist, yet often this is not known to the people involved. In contrast to Ostrom
(2014), where she coded and described the change from a norm-based system to a rule-
based system, we are not interested here in the evolution of rules, but rather in their
existence and impact on participants in an action situation.
Many strategies, norms and rules are not formulated in an easy-to-detect way or often
just exist implicitly (Ostrom 2005: 139). Knowing how difficult it is to detect particularly
the or-else parameter empirically (Schlu¨ter and Theesfeld 2010), we will rather give pri-
ority to the difference which actions are obliged, permitted or forbidden. Thus, we should
be able to assign a deontic logic, i.e., may, must or must not to the formal and informal
institutional statements which we outline in the following.
Further, it is important to note that the distinction between rules and norms does not
correspond with the distinction between formal and informal institutions. Our cases reveal















































Fig. 1 IAD framework to analyze the rule-ordered participation in local political decision-making—the
community planning process. Note: Dashed line arrow - feedback, i.e. outcomes of a participatory process
impact on the rules. Solid line arrow - relationships which we particularly investigate. Source: Adapted from
Ostrom (2005, p. 33)
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punishment for breaking the rules is not set up clearly. Particularly, the distinction between
informal community-level rules and norms is empirically difficult to specify (Schlu¨ter and
Theesfeld 2010). To cope with that, we follow Ostrom (2014), comprising both (rules and
norms) as rules-in-use. Ostrom (2014) suggests, in order to do effective field work and as
the best way to determine the rules-in-use, to let participants outline how they would
explain the actions and processes to fellow villagers. Thus, what we name in the remainder
of the text rules-in-use would be in the narrow sense of the Grammar either a norm or a
rule.
Rules can be classified into seven broad types (see box at the left side of Fig. 1) which
define in general: who is eligible to make decisions in some arena, which actions are
allowed or constrained, which aggregation rules will be used, which procedures must be
followed, which information must or must not be provided and which payoffs will be
assigned to individuals dependent on their actions (Ostrom 2008; Schlu¨ter and Theesfeld
2010; Crawford and Ostrom 1995). Ostrom et al. (1994, pp. 41–42) proposes a horizontal
classification related to the aims of the rules. Transferring these aims from natural resource
appropriation to a collective and deliberative participatory process in development com-
munity planning, we classified the rules accordingly5:
1. Position rules specify a set of positions and how many participants are to hold each
position in the planning process;
2. Boundary rules define who is eligible as a participant (e.g., living in the village might
be required in order to join a community development meeting), and how a certain
person is selected for a position or can leave it.
3. Authority rules specify what a participant in a particular position must, must not or
may do. They define the authority a person has in a particular position in a particular
point in a decision process.
4. Scope rules define the functional scope and the geographic domain that can be affected
by the item being discussed or decided—here a development plan. A permitted or
required action is limited to one location or condition. In our case, this is pre-
determined, because the Tambon development plans apply to a certain geographical
outreach.
5. Aggregation rules refer to decision-making procedures, more specifically to the
participant’s contribution to a final decision about action. This includes the
arrangements to aggregate the preferences of villagers into the community develop-
ment plan and in particular the decision practices within the TAOs in the final issuance
of the plan.
6. Information rules define what information participants holding a certain position must,
must not or may communicate to other participants holding a particular role at certain
points in the decision process—i.e., communication among staff of TAO, among
villagers and between TAOs and villagers. The form of how information is distributed
is also defined by information rules.
7. Payoff rules refer to the incentives and disincentives in terms of resources (e.g., human
resources and funding) available to all position holders to exercise their authority. It is
about rewards and external sanctions linked with certain actions.
When studying the rich diversity of specific rules, it is helpful to turn back to the IAD
framework and particularly to the action situation itself. Each of the seven types of rules
5 Other studies, such as those of Van Damme and Brans (2012, p. 1052) restrict their analysis to boundary,
scope, aggregation and information rules.
Policy Sci
123
affects an individual working part of an action situation (Fig. 2). This helps to distinguish
between the various rules.
It is useful to distinguish three levels of rules that affect the actions taken and the
development projects selected: operational rules, collective-choice rules and constitutional-
choice rules (Ostrom 2005, pp. 58–59). Operational rules are nested in collective-choice
rules and constitutional-choice rules. In this context, the operational rules affect the day-to-
day decisions made by villagers and TAO officials concerning when, where and how to
decide on development projects for the villages, what information to exchange or withheld,
whom to invite to a meeting and how to structure the meeting. Collective-choice rules
indirectly affect operational choices. The collective-choice rules are the rules that are used
by village leaders or by higher ranking TAO officials, or external authorities to determine
who has what role in making policies, e.g., the Guidelines for Development Planning
(Ministry of Interior 2005, 2011). The use of the IAD framework provides important
insights how these two levels interact (Smajgl et al. 2009, p. 3). To define the collective-
choice rules, it is important to understand TAOs’ work as influenced by the Community
Development Department under the Ministry of Interior. Constitutional-choice rules in turn
affect the set of operational rules through their effects in determining who is eligible to
craft the set of collective-choice rules. The constitutional-choice rules might be important
in analyzing the political economy of creating the decentralized development plans in
Thailand (Dufhues et al. 2015) or the dimension of how the social and political unrest of
recent times influences administrative and political processes.6
In the present research, we will primarily concentrate on the operational rules, i.e., the
daily rules-in-use: (a) within 26 selected villages that prepare a community development
plan and (b) within the procedures of four TAOs to finalize the Tambon development plan
including budgetary guidelines.
Research area and data collection
Our research took place in the province of Khon Kaen in Northeast Thailand. As men-
tioned earlier, we focussed on the TAOs, the most widespread decentralized administrative
bodies, and thus the arenas where the deliberation and participation ought to take place.7 In
2009, there were 5767 TAOs in Thailand (Department of Local Administration 2010).
There were 158 TAOs in Khon Kaen province, on average eight to ten TAOs per district.
We worked in the Nom Pong, the Sri-Chompoo and the Manchachiri Districts.
The Khon Kaen Provincial Department of Local Administration assesses the adminis-
trative and management capabilities of each TAO on an annual basis. One part of the
evaluation is to identify in how far public participation of villagers in local planning is
promoted. A committee from the Department of Local Administration reviews the TAO
documents, reports and conducts interviews.8 While over 80% of the TAOs received the
6 We observe since 2006 the political turbulences in the center of Thailand culminating in the military coup
on May 2, 2014. They do have, however, a minor impact on the work of the decentralized administration.
First, the decentralization has started 20 years ago and produced stable and well-rooted administrative
bodies. Second, the conflict between the ‘‘red and yellow shirts’’ is carried out in Bangkok with minor
incidents in the rural areas. Third, the issue of decentralization has been low on the agenda of the warring
political parties.
7 The TAOs received an autonomous status in 1994 through the Tambon Organization Act.
8 The Department of Local Administration employs interviewers to administer that questionnaire. Apart
from TAO staff, they interview 60 randomly selected villagers in each TAO.
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full score in 2010, two were rated with the lowest score (Department of Local Adminis-
tration 2010).
The TAO assessment was important for the selection of our four TAOs for the case
study. We chose the two worst-scored TAOs (names not disclosed but known to authors).
From the top TAOs, we selected two particularly well-performing TAOs, the choice was
substantiated by an award the TAOs received for more participation. We did so in order to
be less dependent on the provincial ranking for our case study selection. We selected the
TAO Suan Mon, which won the award of ‘‘Promoting Public Participation’’ from the King
Prajadhipok’s Institute in 2001, and the award of ‘‘Good Governance’’ from the Office of
Decentralization to Local Government Organization Committee in 2003, 2005–2007, 2009
and 2011. The TAO Nong Pan also won this award several times on 2006–2009 and 2011.
At the first stage of our sampling procedure, this conscious selection, instead of a random
selection, provided us with anticipated most contrasting cases. Thus, the first two TAOs are
supposed to be less participatory in their involvement of villagers into their planning
processes (subsequently named less participative TAOs) in contrast to the latter two, which
are supposed to be more participatory (subsequently named more participative TAOs).
Some basic characteristics of the four TAOs are shown in Table 1.
The livelihoods in all four Tambons are very similar and mainly based on smallholder
agriculture with a focus on paddy rice and sugarcane production. Moreover, many
households receive remittances from relatives in Bangkok or abroad. In terms of infras-
tructure connection, the TAO B. stands out from the other three in its remoteness. But the
other less participatory Tambon K. is closest to the provincial capital. The local tax
collection serves as an indicator for the local economy and underlines the similarity in all
four Tambons.9
We assume that the way in which the operational rules are set differently in the four
TAOs under investigation has an influence on the success of the participation process and
the level of local engagement in political decision-making (Pretty 1994). At first sight, this



























Fig. 2 Rules affecting the elements of an action situation. Source: Adapted from Ostrom (2010, p. 651)
9 The low figures for the percentage of local tax collection are not surprising as TAOs are known for their
low amount of local tax collection.
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alike in all groups, the exogenous factors—here the rules—determine the difference in
success.
‘‘Obtaining information about rules-in-use and their deontic statements (must, must not,
or may) requires spending time at a site and learning how to ask nonthreatening, context-
specific questions about rule configurations,’’ Ostrom (1999, p. 53). Coding forms10 for the
IAD framework to analyze natural resource management had to be reframed for this
context of villagers’ participation in public administration and local political decision-
making. Obviously, the topic was not about appropriators withdrawing a resource unit, but
rather stakeholders taking decisions on development projects. For the operational rules, we
rely on inside views from the participants, explaining their understanding of processes and
implicit rules that guide decisions. To conduct the analysis, we observed community
meetings and conducted 60 semi-structured interviews with the staff members of the four
selected TAOs in 2011. In total, these four TAOs serve 53 villages. Second, we conducted
a survey with 50 village leaders using a standardized questionnaire. This corresponds to
one village leader per village, except three villages which we could not reach. Questions
related to the boundary rules were, for example: ‘‘Who in the village participates and who
not and why?’’, ‘‘Do you usually participate, if not why not?’’, ‘‘Why did people not
participate?’’, ‘‘Are some people actively excluded (who and why)?’’, ‘‘Who decides who
can participate?’’, ‘‘Are you satisfied with these rules?’’, ‘‘Are other people in the village
not satisfied with these rules?’’
Table 1 Basic characteristics of surveyed TAOs and empirical selection criteria







Level of participation Low Low High High –
Number of villages in the TAO
(questionnaire with 50 village leaders)
11 12 14 16 53
Number of selected villages in the TAO
for HH survey
5 6 7 8 26












Average number of persons per HH 4.7 5.4 3.8 4.2 4.5
Number of HH participating in the HH
survey (4 HHs per selected village)
20 24 28 32 104
Distance to district capital in km 3 15 5 15 10
Distance to provincial capital in km 43 130 65 65 76
Share of local tax collection in the total
TAO revenues
0.76 0.64 0.90 0.48 0.70
HH household, data are from 2011, based on personal communication with the chief administrator (Palad) in
each TAO
10 The Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis in Bloomington, Indiana University,




In 2012, to validate the information gained from position holders, we ran an additional
household survey with 104 ordinary villagers, which were randomly selected in 26 out of
the 53 villages belonging to the respective TAOs. The survey contained questions in
relation to rule implementation. Regarding the boundary rules, questions were for instance:
‘‘Who can join the community development plan meeting?’’, ‘‘Do you usually attend the
community plan meeting, and if not, why not?’’, ‘‘Are there any people in the village who
never take part in the community plan meeting, and if yes, what kind of people and why do
they not take part?’’
As far as possible, we asked for a clarification if the actors may, must or must not
conduct a certain action and for explanation of the sanctions in case of non-compliance.
Yet, if people were not aware of the actual rule-setting, we needed to draw conclusions on
the obligation, prohibition or permission status of the rule-in-use, based on the usual
routines the majority of people described. Further, it turned out that most of the rules we
discovered were informal and not written down. Those informal rules-in-use can only be
detected if asked to explain a process to a fellow. It is even more difficult to infer on non-
material sanctions assigned to this statement, which can derive, e.g., from individual’s
internalized moral values, like ‘‘I do not feel good, if I do not participate in the village
meeting.’’ Thus, there is a very fine line between a norm and a rule in a narrow sense.
All answers have been checked for differences between the affiliation to the less and
more participative TAOs. If not stated otherwise, all reported answers are statistically
significant at least at the 0.05 level.
The action situation: local development planning
The action situation is the central element in the IAD framework. It provides the institu-
tional context that actual participants in an action arena have to face (Ostrom 2010). For
analytical purposes and to carefully consider the various participants’ interactions, we
divided the local development planning process into two phases: Phase 1—‘‘Surveying
villagers’ needs’’—results in the community development plan as an output and represents
the first action situation. Phase 2—‘‘Compiling villagers’ needs’’—represents the second
action situation, where needs are integrated into the Tambon development plan prepared
within the respective TAO, and finally built together with the budget the guideline for
implementing different projects within this plan. We identified two action situations in this
way because the institutional context changes and the possible positions to be held by
participants are different. Figure 3 presents a summary of the two phases of Tambon
development planning and the various collective units.
Action situation I and II in the planning process
The window of opportunity during which direct deliberation between TAO officials and
villagers can take place is in the course of the annual community development plan
meetings. In these community meetings, the development projects of the forthcoming
Tambon development plan should be prioritized by the villagers themselves.
As regards the first action situation, no formal rules exist on how to conduct the
community development meetings. All rules concerning those meetings can be seen as
informal and rather ‘‘may-statements’’ without formal material sanctions in case of non-
fulfillment, but most likely addressing internalized moral values or social mechanisms of
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enforcement. TAO officials may join the community development meetings. We found that
they participate in about 80% of the villages. Some of those villages (40%) conduct two
development meetings (the first one without TAO officials and the second one with TAO
officials) (Path 1 and 2 in Fig. 3).
Action situation II outlines the usual routines following the obligation to condense the
individual village project wish list to a workable and budget-conforming TAO project list.
Action situation II specifies how the selection of village projects, which are finally
implemented in each TAO, is made. After the yearly updates of the community devel-
opment plans are collected, a draft of the Tambon development plan has to be prepared by
the promotion committee and then submitted to the public Tambon civic forum. After
revisions are made, it should be submitted via the promotion committee to the development
committee and then checked by the president of the TAO who also may change the plan.
Finally, it has to be approved by the TAO council meeting. Further, an extra budgetary
Planning process phase one –
Surveying villagers’ needs
Planning process phase two –
Compiling villagers’ needs



















Fig. 3 Requirement for developing the Tambon development plan. Note: 1Each village committee has to
select one of their members to join the Tambon civic forum. Key representatives from related government
agencies such as a school director, head of public health center, head of Tambon hospital may join.
2Members are: Chief administrator of TAO (chairman), secretary (which can be the head of administration,
the plan and policy analyst or a public work division officer), head of financial division, head of public work
division, representative from government sector, three persons from the Tambon civic forum. 3Members are:
The president of the TAO, two vice presidents of the TAO, three TAO representatives, three local experts
(appointed by the TAO president), three representatives from the government sector (appointed by the TAO
president), three to six members of the Tambon civic forum, chief administrator of TAO and the plan and
policy analyst. Source: Own figure based on Ministry of Interior (2005)
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meeting has to be held and the TAO council has to decide this time on the final budget.11
Although this rough formal procedure is an obligation outlined by the Ministry of Interior
(2005), empirical evidence shows that the detailed application of the law is what matters.
We found that, in practice, those meetings are reordered, combined or replaced by other
meetings with or without village representatives. The deviance from the official meeting
requirements (which would be, in the narrow sense, only a norm and no rule as no
sanctioning had been reported for a dropped meeting) is higher in the less participatory
TAOs. Likewise, the extent to which officials disregard the original village plan is greater.
The participants and positions in the action situations
As stated earlier, the three important internal working parts of an action situation are the
participants, the positions they are respectively assigned to and the set of actions that
participants can take (Ostrom 2005, p. 38). While in Phase 1 of the development planning
process ordinary villagers can influence the outcome (as participants of a community
development meeting), during the second phase ordinary villagers no longer occupy a
position in the planning process (Fig. 3). In Phase 2, all positions are held by elected
representatives, assigned key persons, politicians and civil servants, who of course may
have originally been ordinary villagers.
The TAO consists of two units—the TAO council and the TAO committee. We can
confirm the findings of Badenoch (2006, p. 45), who stated that besides such responsi-
bilities as drafting the budget, implementing plans or monitoring TAO committee’s
activities, the main responsibility of the TAO council is approving the Tambon develop-
ment plan and the corresponding budget. The responsibilities of the TAO committee are to
manage development activities, propose development and budget plans to the council and
to report progress to the council.
The TAO council has to be composed of, among others, two directly elected repre-
sentatives from every village. The council is the immediate source of local accountability.
The chairman of the TAO council, the vice-chairman of TAO council and the secretary of
the TAO council must be elected by the TAO council members from their membership.
But, in addition the post of secretary of the TAO council may be filled by a non-council
member, who is usually the Chief Administrator of the TAO, a paid staff member called
the Palad. Typically, the Palad ought to have a good knowledge of administrative proce-
dure, and it was found to be the reason why all the TAO councils in our sample filled this
position with the Palad.
The TAO representatives are a new sort of leadership in the village due to their role in
accessing the Tambon resources through drafting the Tambon development plan (Bade-
noch 2006: 88). Village committee members (the village head, due to his position, and
other elected villagers) must in turn elect members into the Tambon civic forum.
TAO civil servants also influence the plan making process. Those staffers include the
Palad, the plan and policy analyst, the head of the financial division, and the head of the
public works division. Local experts, such as school directors, heads of public health
centers or hospitals, may also be assigned to various subcommittees preparing the Tambon
development plan, as are representatives of the Tambon civic forum and committee. The
plan and policy analyst, in particular, has a central role in the process. He/she, for instance,
11 This procedure is of course far away from a sophisticated public participation model of planning efforts
described e.g. by Renn et al. (1993) as a procedural framework that enables the generation of consensual
policy suggestions among citizens, stakeholders and experts.
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shall record the proposed projects from the village community meetings. He/she shall draft
the Tambon development plan several times. The first draft may include a budget and a
time frame for individual projects suggested at the community meetings. This should be an
input for the promotion committee whose members may adjust the budget and time frame
of each project and may make a pre-selection. The development committee must decide
subsequently whether or not to keep those projects in the plan. That means in fact, if the
development and promotion committees are not holding a meeting—as in one of our less
participatory TAOs—then the initial proposal drafted by the plan and policy analyst is
what goes directly to the TAO council. As we already found here slight exceptions from
the obligation—without reported formal consequences—we define these rules according to
their deontic logic as may-statements, i.e., permissions or optional provisions.
Rules
In the following, we will present the rules defining an action situation along the lines of the
seven types of rules (Ostrom 2005, 2010) and as applied to participation in development
community planning as outlined in ‘‘Rules in participatory procedures’’ section.
Collective-choice rules: action situations I and II
The Department of Local Administration, which is part of the Ministry of Interior, has set
up the guideline for the creation of the Tambon development plan and the development
budget.12 These formal requirements determine that the budget is the final output of the
planning process and must contain the projects which will be actually implemented and
their corresponding budgets (Office of the State Council 1998). The Tambon development
plan and the development budget must be reviewed annually to evaluate the development
strategies, methods and measures that had been chosen earlier and to assess whether they
are still effective. We understand these guidelines as collective-choice rules. They define
the participants’ room for maneuvering.
Operational rules: action situation I—surveying villagers’ needs
As there are no formal rules for the way the community plan meeting has to be organized,
we will depict the rules-in-use, which we found most frequently across the 50 villages
studied. It is difficult to differentiate such rules by the type and seriousness of sanctions
associated with them, as particularly informal sanctions relying on individual or social
pressure are very hidden from a researcher (Schlu¨ter and Theesfeld 2010). Table 2 depicts
the descriptive statistics of the collected data underlying the selected rules-in-use.
Boundary rules The participation in the community development meetings is voluntary;
every person from the age of 15 on may participate. Village leaders such as the village
head and TAO representatives usually take part, which indicates an obligation. In some
cases, the TAO has explicitly invited village leaders or certain villagers. Some people
never join and some of them state that they do not care about such meetings. Another
12 The TAO budget is channeled through the Department of Local Administration. Apart from that, the
Department only advises and monitors the TAO performance. But it has no power to interfere with the
internal administration of the TAO.
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decisive factor is timing. About a quarter of the villagers do not care when the meeting
takes place, but some state they are unable to join the meeting during daytime due to their
working hours. This especially concerns poorer households where adults have to work
often outside the village. Still, a meeting in the evening is preferred only by about 40%. In
some cases, the community development meetings are held jointly for several villages.
Participation of more remote villagers is low in those joint meetings, because of travel
distances.
The representativeness of the community development meetings varies greatly between
the villages, but on average the number of meetings is lower and, as shown in Table 2, the
attendance rate is indeed lower in the less participatory TAOs. Likewise, data show with
statistical significance that more villagers in the problematic TAOs state that some people
never participate in any community development meeting (74% compared to 39%).
Generally, however, among boundary rules specifying timing, merging of meetings or
eligibility attributes of participants, no exclusionary impact can be found toward particular
village groups. When considered together with the information rules on timing and out-
reach of the announcement (presented in the following), the boundary rules do have an
impact on the attendance rate.
Information rules The village head has to inform the villagers about the community
development meeting. We can reproduce the findings of Fung (2003) who states that the









% n % n % n Sig.




84 61 56 44 71 105 0.001
Are there any villagers who never




39 69 74 34 50 103 0.001
Do you talk with other villagers about the
development projects or possible
proposals before the meeting?
1 = yes
0 = no
27 78 7 44 20 122 0.007
Is there strong interference of village
leaders into the proposing and ranking




4 48 27 22 11 70 0.005
Is there pre-selection of projects by village
leaders or strong interference of village
leaders into the proposing and ranking
process during community meetings?
1 = yes
0 = no
9 49 50 22 20 71 0.001
Mean n Mean n Mean n t test
How many days before the meeting
are you informed?
Days 1.44 78 0.76 42 1.20 120 0.001
a In some villages, more than one development meeting is conducted. Therefore, the ‘‘n’’ numbers do not
correspond directly to the original sample size
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number of participants in community events depends most of all on the ability of orga-
nizers to mobilize individuals. One rule deals with the way the information is spread.
Villagers are usually informed via public loudspeakers, which are located at a central place
in the village. In almost all of the 26 villages which have been surveyed more intensively,
the interviewees were informed about the date and the time of the community meeting via
village loudspeakers. A small share of people did not take part in the meetings because the
loudspeaker is not loud enough to reach their houses. In a few cases, villagers are also
personally invited by an invitation letter (about 5–6%), which shows that this permission—
to invite in written form—exists as well. About 8% of the village heads stated that they
have to ensure that every villager is invited, besides using the loudspeaker. Interestingly,
this rule has been only mentioned in the more participatory TAOs. In total, 96% of the
villagers were content with the way the meetings are announced.
Yet, meetings are announced on a rather short notice (on average 1 day before). There is
statistically significant empirical evidence that villagers living in the more participatory
TAOs are informed earlier (Table 2). Timing seems to be a crucial issue as a quarter of
villagers mentioned that they would like to be informed earlier. A share of 30% of the
villagers mentioned this in the less participatory TAOs, compared to 19% in the other
villages. This particular difference could not be shown with statistical significance.
Another important information rule defines how and when villagers may start discussing
development project proposals which shall be ranked. While over 80% of the village
leaders stated that villagers talked about the development projects before the meeting, only
20% of the interviewed villagers stated the same. With statistical significance, we can show
that the share of villagers making this statement is higher in the more participatory TAOs.
We infer from that, that in those villages, people are permitted to know about the project
proposals beforehand.
Payoff rules An additional payoff refers to incentives and rewards in terms of, e.g.,
funding or side-payments available to a position holder. One aspect showing an immaterial
social reward is that those people who regularly take part in the community development
meetings are more highly respected by the other villagers. In only three villages, which
interestingly belong to the less participatory TAOs, it was mentioned that this would not be
the case.
In the more participatory TAOs, the attendance rate is almost identical across the
villages despite the show-up bonus, of 50 Baht (1.4 US Dollar), that was paid in one of the
studied villages. Apart from that, in rare cases, candy or coffee is served, representing the
only material payoff.
Aggregation rules An important aggregation rule is represented by the widespread voting
procedure for projects: an open ballot, by raising hands. It is worth scrutinizing this
operational rule. We would like to provide two cases to exemplify the possible options in
such ranking and voting rules.
In one village located in a less participatory TAO, the project proposals were listed on
the wall by order in which they were proposed. Then, the TAO official asked: ‘‘What
project do you like to have as number one?’’ A villager would tell the name of a project and
the moderator would ask whether all villagers agree to have it as number one. The villagers
would vote. If a simple majority was found, this project would be accepted with that rank.
That means the person who mentions a project quickly has the highest chance to have that
project get a high rank. Furthermore, projects cannot be ranked against each other within
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such a procedure. In comparison, in a village located in a more participatory TAO, all
proposals were listed, at first. Only thereafter, the question was: ‘‘Who votes for project
No. 1, 2, 3, …?’’ Everybody had three votes and the proposal with the most votes would
win. Unfortunately, it was not possible to collect such observational data at a larger number
of meetings to allow generalization on these observations. Yet, it shows what impact such
little procedural rule differences could have.
Another aggregation rule defines that elites can partly preselect development projects.
According to villagers such a pre-selection happens in 10% of the meetings. However, in
the less participatory TAOs this was mentioned more often. Yet the difference of 16%
compared to 9% is not statistically significant. A corresponding aggregation rule is that
elites may erase proposals from the list. A share of 9% of the villagers noted that during the
meetings village leaders strongly interfere in the process, e.g., by deleting projects they
dislike from the plan. Quite revealing here is that in the more participatory TAOs sig-
nificantly less villagers mentioned this (4%) compared to (27%) in the other villages. This
can be shown with a statistically significant group difference. When we combine both
forms of interference (pre-selection of projects and direct interference at the meetings), the
share of villagers who note such customs reaches 50% in the less participatory TAOs as
compared to 9% in the more participatory TAOs. The survey of 50 village leaders confirms
such customs at large.
In sum, 29% of the villagers in the less participative TAOs stated that they could
influence the village development plan only with great difficulties or not at all, compared to
only 18% who stated such difficulties in the more successful TAOs. However, based on our
sample, we cannot substantiate this with an appropriate significance level.
Operational rules: action situation II - Compiling villagers needs
into the Tambon development plan
Concerning the operational rules within the TAO administration, we focus on the rules
specifying how a person can gain certain positions, as this has been regarded as non-
transparent. Further, we focus on the aggregation rules, the most challenging to be revealed
empirically and likewise the ones exemplifying the detailed decision-making procedure
within the TAOs.
Boundary and position rules
In both the more- and less participatory TAOs, there is a lot of confusion among the
villagers as to their functions in a particular meeting, and how long they may fill a certain
position. One issue is that the various committee meetings are often combined, postponed
or replaced by a different purpose meeting. There is empirical evidence that in the less
participatory TAOs more stages of committee meetings are omitted. In that regard, one
rule-in-use in a less participatory TAO is instead of letting the individual participants sign
the participants’ list, the Palad may officially approve that all members were present. The
knowledge gap about the existence of various positions, unclear membership in certain
committees and concerns with inconsistency in the names listed on committee meeting
protocols are particularly tangible in the less participatory TAOs.
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Authority and aggregation rules in the promotion and development committees
The promotion committee has to draft the development plan, including time frame and
budget of each single project proposal. The committee then has to select the first three to
five projects from each community plan (authority rules). The aggregation rule to reach an
agreement in the more participatory TAOs is that after a village has received a big project,
the village has to wait a year or two until they receive another one. In cases where two
villages compete for funds, the promotion committee may consider those projects first
which will create benefits for more villagers. In addition, representatives from government
agencies in the committee may propose their own projects and add them to the draft plan.
In the less participatory TAOs, village members of the promotion committees reported
that they redo the plan during this meeting, without much reference to the original com-
munity plans. Some state that they keep only those projects which they roughly kept in
mind, without considering the written records. No sanctions have been reported for such
actions, which lets us draw the conclusion that this permission to redo the list is the rule-in-
use.
TAO officials could not outline the main features of development committee meetings
in terms of objectives and procedures, referring to rather no strong obligations (may-
deontic). The only exception is that most of them state that in both committees changes in
the procedures must be accepted by a simple majority vote. Thus, we interpret the latter as
an obligation (must-deontic).
Authority and aggregation rules in the TAO council
Interviews with TAO representatives revealed that the TAO council meeting, which has to
decide on the Tambon development plan (authority rule), almost always follows the rec-
ommendation of the president of the TAO and the promotion and development committee
(aggregation rule). Thus, the decision-making power at the TAO council can be regarded
as a pro forma one. As pointed out by Walker (2008, p. 88), the increased financial budget
autonomy of the TAOs has aggravated budgetary competition between the ten to fifteen
villages in a single TAO. Empirical observation revealed that TAO representatives simply
follow recommendations of the higher authority—supposedly to avoid conflict responsi-
bility over the distribution of development budget among different villages (aggregation
rule). This kind of social pressure (non-material sanction) can be regarded as the deter-
minant why people follow this informal rule-in-use of simply letting the proposed plan
pass.
Conclusions
The integrative approach of the IAD framework and its central concept of the action
situation were very valuable in dividing the decentralized and participatory development
planning process in rural Thailand into two phases. Namely, first, the village prioritizing
process for development projects and second, the TAO decision-making processes toward
a final development plan. It turned out to be extremely insightful to disentangle the
respective participants and their involvement in this kind of local political decision-making
process according to various types of rules (Ostrom et al. 1994). The study of rules by use
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of the IAD framework required first reordering of the rich empirical material according to
rule types, rather than chronologically along the lines of the participatory procedure.
We reached conclusions on preconditions, i.e., necessary up-front rule changes that
would allow for better stakeholder participation within the process of local development
planning. Drawing concrete policy lessons for the Thai case, we stress that spreading
information about aim and scope of certain committees and about possibilities to take and
abandon positions in such committees is crucial.
The more participatory TAOs—administrative bodies which are known for success in
achieving participation—follow in general more standardized rules. In contrast to the
literature on interactive policy making, Van Damme and Brans (2012) have concluded that
it is not particularly the openness of process rules in public consultation processes that are
able to deliver good overall outcomes. They found that clear and detailed rules on who
needs to be consulted, about what, and where seemed to be important for the performance
of a consultation process. The trade-off is that the managers of the process lose autonomy
in making the participatory process fit to the situation at hand. Yet, better designed formal
rules can only control or steer that part of haphazard participatory processes which is due to
unawareness while the intentional deviation from the rule to secure personal advantages
remains more difficult to control. Our research further substantiates the advantages of some
pre-defined obligations as well as a clearer distinction between obligations and permission.
As shown here, openness of rules, which otherwise can be seen as flexibility from the
managers’ perspective, can easily turn into fuzziness and lack of clarity from the per-
spective of the local population. In the more participatory TAOs, the rules are perceived as
more transparent and can be recapitulated by interviewees. The actual rules-in-use enabled
a higher number of participants and thus a larger range of opinions in the committee
meetings, restraining personalized decision-making.
Disentangling the various rules and participant involvement in the planning processes, it
became evident that not all rules are equally important in supporting participation of local
communities in development planning. As we have seen from the detailed studying of rules
in the two phases of the development planning process, the aggregation rules within the
higher authority, in particular—specifying how to transform actions into a final outcome,
are decisive for letting the locals’ propositions come into being.
We could highlight an impact of both formal and informal rules of the decision-making
process on the actually achieved level of participation. Although most rules are rather
informal, we can draw some conclusion on their deontic logic, differentiating obligations,
prohibitions or permissions, which means the de facto must or may interpretation of the
rules. Based on the interviewees’ explanations of the routines, we identified a high share of
may-statements and the severity of external and internal sanctions expressed.
We can further show particular differences in rules, some of them being statistically
significant, depending on whether a TAO is ranked as more or less participatory. For
instance, in the less participatory TAOs the attendance rate in the community meetings is
lower (boundary rule), villagers are informed about a planned meeting with a shorter notice
(information rule) and more villagers mention that elites interfere in the project selection
process (aggregation rule). This clearly shows the importance of the exogenous rule set-
tings in determining the deliberative democratic process, compared to the endogenous
cultural factors which are almost equal across all 50 villages studied.
Besides the Thai TAO case-based output, this study has wider significance for the
analysis of participatory processes in general. Rules can be used as an analytical tool to
find a window of opportunity to intervene and facilitate participation. We can thus provide
better policy recommendations of where and how to support the participatory efforts,
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instead of discussing specific habits of individual administrative bodies and committees. It
seems fitting that the IAD framework, which originally grew out of municipal public
administration studies in the 1970s before it was elaborated and widely applied to natural
resource management, can now be applied fruitfully once again to deliberative democratic
processes.
The application of the framework allows us to zero in on key factors that policy makers
can actually address in order to increase public participation. Local-level policy makers
can do little to change the sociocultural setting, even less to change the communication
habits of the respective societies, yet they might be able to re-shape the collective-choice
and operational-choice-level rules that prevail in participation measures in local decision-
making. Further applied lessons encompass that information on administrative procedures
have to be made more accessible and public administrators should receive procedural
trainings (e.g., in inviting to meetings, writing protocols and managing open votes). Both
steps are likely to bring more clarity to the decision-making processes and thus improve
deliberation and public participation.
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